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Volume 2005, Issue 2
CASES
Passions Video v.
Jay Nixon , 04-0760-CVW-GA (W.D.
Mo. Feb. 11, 2005)
A Missouri statute’s time, place, and
manner regulation of 'adult' billboards and
advertising signs is constitutional.
LAW REVIEWS
Abigail K. Holland, Constitutionality
of Mandatory Filters on Federally Funded Internet
Access in Public Libraries - United States v.
American Library Association, Inc., 539 U.S. 194
(2003), 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
217 (2004)
Kate Reder, Ashcroft
v. ACLU: Should Congress Try, Try, and Try Again,
or Does the International Problem of Regulating
Internet Pornography Require an International
Solution?, 6 N.C. J. L. &
Tech. 139 (2004)
Jisuk Woo, The
Concept of "Harm" in Computer-Generated
Images of Child Pornography,
22 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 717(2004)
[ Back
to Top ]
Passions
Video v. Jay Nixon , 04-0760-CVW-GA
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2005)
A Missouri statute’s time, place,
and manner regulation of 'adult' billboards and
advertising signs is constitutional.
Passions Video and another sexually oriented
business owner sought to enjoin revised Missouri
statutes regulating sexually oriented businesses.
In part, the statute provides:
No billboard or other exterior advertising sign,
for an adult cabaret or sexually-oriented business
shall be located within one mile of any state
highway except if such business is located within
one mile of state highway then the business may
display a maximum of two exterior signs on the
premises of the business, consisting of one identification
sign and one sign solely giving notice that the
premises are off limits to minors. The identification
sign shall be no more than forty square feet in
size and shall include no more than the following
information: name, street address, telephone number,
and operating hours of business. Missouri Revised
Statutes § 226.531 (2).
Passions alleged violations of the First Amendment,
the Takings Clause and Equal Protection. With
regard to the First Amendment claim, the court
acknowleged the right of the state to regulate
“the time, place and manner” of an
establishment so long as the regulation is content-neutral
and there is a substantial governmental interested
served which focuses on adverse secondary effects.
Citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); Young v. American
Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976).
The court also noted that regulations must be
narrowly tailored to meet the governmental interest
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
The court further cited the four-part test for
regulation of commercial speech set forth in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980):
(1) [T]he Court must determine if the First Amendment
protects the Speech in question; (2) if the First
Amendment does afford the speech protection, the
court must determine whether the state’s
governmental interest is substantial; (3) if the
first two elements are established, the court
then must determine whether the statute or regulation
directly advances the government’s claimed
interest; and (4) the court must determine whether
the statute or regulation is more extensive than
necessary.
Applying the Central Hudson test, the
court held there was no First Amendment violation
and it summarily dismissed Passions takings and
equal protection claims.
(all abstracts excerpted from law review
introductions)
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]
Abigail K. Holland, Constitutionality
of Mandatory Filters on Federally Funded Internet
Access in Public Libraries - United States v.
American Library Association, Inc., 539 U.S. 194
(2003), 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 217
(2004)
In United States v. American Library Association,
Inc., the Court considered if filters on
Internet access in public libraries violated the
First Amendment. The Court held that filters did
not violate the First Amendment by narrowly interpreting
the purpose of Internet access and mistakenly
applying the standard of analysis used for print
collection decisions to Internet filtering, despite
their differing natures. The Court's failure to
recognize and protect the expressive value of
the Internet only serves to shrink the marketplace
of ideas that the First Amendment was designed
to protect.
[ Back to Top
]
Kate Reder, Ashcroft
v. ACLU: Should Congress Try, Try, and Try Again,
or Does the International Problem of Regulating
Internet Pornography Require an International
Solution?, 6 N.C. J. L. & Tech.
139 (2004)
In its decision in Ashcroft v. ACLU,
the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General
had not convincingly rebutted the contention of
plaintiff Internet content providers that filtering
software was less restrictive and just as effective
as the legislation Mr. Ashcroft sought to defend.
The Supreme Court was correct to uphold the preliminary
injunction against the Child Online Protection
Act ("COPA"), but the Court, by reading
the legal issue narrowly, left the American public
with the lesser of two evils instead of a genuine
solution. While the holding is correct in a strictly
legal sense, the decision does very little to
protect either children or the First Amendment.
This [article] . . . traces Congress' reaction
to Internet pornography, using Ashcroft v.
ACLU as a case study to illustrate the pattern
Congress traditionally follows: tailoring subsequent
legislation to the specifications of Supreme Court
decisions. This [article] . . . argues that following
Congress' pattern in this case will only lead
to further litigation because filters, the solution
proposed in Ashcroft, along with any
national solution, will have a negative impact
on free speech rights. This [article] . . . concludes
that in order to protect both children and the
First Amendment, the Internet pornography industry
must be treated as just that: an international
industry. By urging the Internet pornography industry
to accept "best practice guidelines,"
the United States government will be protecting
children and the guarantees of the First Amendment.
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]
Jisuk Woo, The
Concept of "Harm" in Computer-Generated
Images of Child Pornography, 22
J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 717(2004)
Assume that a computer literate who produces
child pornography uses his computer to create
an image depicting a child as being engaged in
sexual act, where there is no real child involved.
The images he produces look so real that they
are indistinguishable from actual photographs
of real children, but the photographic image is
entirely a technological creation. Could the person
who produced these images be convicted for violation
of child pornography law? Where the "person"
in the image is created by the computer, and does
not actually exist, should these images still
be banned in order to protect children from being
harmed? This paper examines such issues surrounding
computer-generated images of child pornography
against the concept of harm which has been the
central focus of child pornography regime.
Part I describes the ways in which the technological
development has generated new concerns about child
pornography, and Part II discusses child pornography
law and relevant arguments of anti-pornography
feminists. Part III analyzes the ways in which
different kinds of harm are conceived and supported
by empirical evidence. Part IV examines the ways
in which computer-generated images of child pornography
raise different concerns regarding the harm caused
by child pornography.
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]
(all abstracts excerpted from law review
introductions)
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