Volume 2008,
Issue 3
CLICK
HERE FOR ONLINE DAILY NEWS AND CASE UPDATES
ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
TX: Case of 12-year-old dancer prompts call for ordinance change
Dallas Morning News, Tanya Eiserer, 3.28.2008
IN: Booksellers incensed over sexual content law
Indianapolis Star, Tim Evans, 3.26.2008
ACLU asks Sacramento library board to relax pornography controls
California Catholic Daily, 3.24.2008
Research:
U.S. Children are Victims of Sex Trafficking
PR Newswire, 3.24.2008
NYT Editorial: The Supreme Court and Indecency
NYT, 3.23.2008
Cell
Phone Porn Leads to Kids Arrest
Family News in Focus, 3.20.2008
Supreme
Court to review FCC indecency case
SCOTUSblog, 3.17.2008
Libraries
Must Report Child Pornography to Police
Christian Newswire, 3.14.2008
Study:
Increased Pornography Acceptance Among Young Adult
Women
BYU NewsNet, Courtney Waters, 3.3.2008
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CASES
United States v. Davenport
2008 WL 732491 (9th Cir. March 20, 2008)
9th Circuit rules that separate convictions for
"reception" and "possession"
of child pornography arising from identical facts
violates the Constitution's double jeapordy prohibition.
United States v. Hudspeth
2008 WL 637638 (C.A.8 (Mo.) March 11, 2008)
8th Circuit rules that wife's consent is sufficient
for police to search husband's computer for child
pornography.
LAW REVIEWS
Regulating Internet
Pornography Aimed at Children: A Comparative Constitutional
Perspective on Passing the Camel through the Needle’s
Eye
Mark S. Kende, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1623 (2007)
Bachelor Parties
Beware: The Third Circuit Grapples With Alcohol,
Strip Clubs and the Constitutionality of Morality
Legislation
52 Vill. L. Rev. 1095 (2007)
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CASES
United
States v. Davenport 2008 WL 732491 (C.A.9
(Mont.) March 20, 2008)
9th Circuit rules that
separate convictions for "reception"
and "possession" of child pornography
constitutes an offense to double jeapordy.
The 9th Circuit panel of three
judges ruled that Winston Davenport's conviction
for both receipt and possession
of child pornography "offends [the Fifth
Amendments prohibition on] double jeopardy when
the conduct underlying both claims is the same."
Judge Ronald M. Gould authored the opinion on
behalf of the 2-1 majority with Judge Susan
P. Graber dissenting.
Davenport was indicted on "on
one count of receiving child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), one
count of possessing child pornography in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and one
count of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a)
which requires defendants convicted of child
pornography offenses to relinquish all rights
to the computer on which the pornography was
found."
On appeal Davenport reasoned
that "it is impossible to ‘receive’
something without, at least at the very instant
of ‘receipt,’ also ‘possessing’
it" and, therefore, that possession is a
"lesser, included offense of receipt."
The government attempted to point out a difference
between receipt and possession based on an analysis
of interstate commerce: the "receipt provision"
requires that the actual pornographic material
be shipped or transported [including by computer]
in interstate commerce; the "possession provision"
only need regard pornography produced using materials
obtained through interstate commerce." Following
a test outlined in Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932), the 9th Circuit disagreed
arguing that "a conviction for receipt necessarily
includes proof of the elements required for conviction
under possession, and possession is a lesser included
offense of receipt."
In her dissent, Judge Gruber
argued that the Blockburger test is 'a
rule of statutory construction,' and not controlling
in the context of a "clear indication of
legislative intent." It was the opinion of
Judge Bruber that, since Congress intended to
"treat child pornography severely" (and
adjusted the law accordingly) it also intended
that receipt and possession "remain separate
crimes." Judge Gould admitted the plausibility
of Gruber's analysis but pointed out that "it
could not be said that Congress 'clearly' intended
it" and that in the absence of absolute clarity,
lenity is required.
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United
States v. Hudspeth 2008 WL 150704 (8th Cir.
Jan. 17, 2008)
8th Circuit rules that wife's consent
is sufficient for police to search husband's
computer for child pornography.
After being charged for having child pornography
on his office computer, Roy Hudspeth refused
to allow police to search his computer for child
pornography. Police then went to his home and
asked his wife for permission to search the
home computer. She consented. The 8th Circuit
majority ruled that her consent was sufficient.
Judge Riley for the majority:
Under the totality of circumstances
of the present case, maintaining the Fourth
Amendment’s touchstone requirement against
unreasonable searches and seizures, we conclude
the seizure of Hudspeth’s home computer
was reasonable and the Fourth Amendment was
not violated when the officers sought Mrs. Hudspeth’s
consent despite having received Hudspeth’s
previous refusal. We affirm the district court’s
denial of Hudspeth’s motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from the warrantless seizure
of Hudspeth’s home computer.
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LAW REVIEWS
(Abstracts excerpted from
article introductions, citations omitted)
Regulating
Internet Pornography Aimed at Children: A Comparative
Constitutional Perspective on Passing the Camel
through the Needle’s Eye
Mark S. Kende, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1623 (2007)
In this paper, I recommend that the Court stop
the formalism and the inconsistencies. Actually,
I go a step further and recommend that the Court
borrow a page from the way foreign courts, such
as the South African Constitutional Court, have
engaged in an explicit balancing of interests
and values while also being minimalist when possible.
South Africa provides an excellent comparative
lens for several reasons. Its constitutional drafters
examined the best provisions from countries like
Canada, Germany, Namibia, and the United States
and then tried to improve upon them. Moreover,
its Constitutional Court’s decisions are
highly regarded internationally, it has a racial
history that parallels the United States, and
the Court’s opinions are stylistically accessible.
There has recently been controversy over the
U.S. Supreme Court’s increasing use of
foreign constitutional law. Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Scalia, and various conservative scholars
have said that foreign law is used selectively
in order to promote the agendas of particular
members of the Court. The implication is that
this agenda is liberal. Yet this paper shows
that foreign law can support a speech restriction
that would cause discomfort to some liberals.
Perhaps foreign law does not have to be ideological
after all if courts survey foreign sources more
comprehensively.
This paper has six parts. Part II discusses
key U.S. Supreme Court cases establishing the
speech categories and the rule against content
discrimination. Part III shows how these principles
play out in the Court’s Internet free
speech decisions. Part IV demonstrates how the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its treatment
of unprotected speech and in its treatment of
content discrimination. Part V shows how the
most important American Internet speech case
would have been resolved if the Supreme Court
openly adopted the proportionality analysis
used in South Africa, which is derived from
Germany and Canada. Part V also addresses some
possible criticisms. Part VI offers a brief
conclusion.
Bachelor Parties
Beware: The Third Circuit Grapples With Alcohol,
Strip Clubs and the Constitutionality of Morality
Legislation
52 Vill. L. Rev. 1095 (2007)
This Casebrief will show that the Third Circuit’s
recent approach to the regulation of exotic dance
establishments is incomplete, in that (1) it is
arguably discordant with the Supreme Court precedent
and (2) it impractically rejects the application
of an “implied narrowing construction.”
Part II of this Casebrief discusses the Supreme
Court’s fractured and contentious jurisprudential
approach to sex industry regulations, and describes
the approaches other circuit courts apply when
confronting similar statutory challenges. Part
III focuses on the analytical structure of the
Third Circuit’s recent decisions. It also
discusses suggested amendments to the Pennsylvania
statute and proposes a synthesized analytical
guide for practitioners who may challenge similar
statutes in the future. Finally, Part IV places
the recent Third Circuit cases into the larger
societal context–the battle over whether
morality legislation has its place in current
state statutory frameworks.
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